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John Courtney Murray, S.J.: A Citizen of Two Cities
Remarks of Robert John Araujo, S.J.*
Charles Dickens began his Tale of Two Cities with the memorable
line, "It was the best of times; it was the worst of times."' Dickens'
great saga takes us back and forth between two very different worlds,
one in England and the other in France, during the bloody turmoil of the
French Revolution. The juxtaposition of such diverse places existing in
parallel fashion suggests something about the times in which Fr. John
Courtney Murray lived-in a world of depression, of two global wars,
and of a new kind of tension called the Cold War. And how did he
address the challenging era in which he lived? It may have been
Murray's training as a theologian that made him understand the best and
worst of his times; it may have been the fact that he was a lawyer's son
who understood the importance of the rule of law in governing a society
* John Courtney Murray, S.J. University Professor, Loyola University Chicago. A.B.,
Georgetown University; M.Div., S.T.L., Weston School of Theology; Ph.B., St. Michael's
Institute; B.C.L., Oxford University; J.D., Georgetown University; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia
University.
Upon completing military service as an officer in the United States Army, Fr. Araujo served as
a trial attorney and attorney advisor in the Solicitor's Office of the United States Department of
the Interior (1974-1979). In 1979, he joined the Law Department of the Standard Oil Company
(Ohio) and served in a variety of capacities until 1985. After corporate service, he joined the
general corporate department of a New England law firm and remained there until entering the
Society of Jesus in 1986. Since 1997, he has served as an advisor to the Holy See providing
counsel on issues dealing with public international law.
He was also a member of the law faculty at Gonzaga University from 1994-2005 and became
the Robert Bellarmine, S.J. University Professor in American and Public International law. He
then became Ordinary Professor at the Pontifical Gregorian University from 2005-2008. He has
been a visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, St. Louis University School of
Law, and Boston College School of Law. In the academic year 2000-2001, he was the Stein
Fellow at Fordham University Law School. During his graduate legal studies in New York, he
was the Chamberlain Fellow at Columbia University School of Law.
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 3 (Huber Gray Buehler & Lawrence Mason,
eds., The MacMillan Co. 1922) (1859).
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of ordered liberty; it may have been his priesthood which helped him
put all of the tumult of his life and times into context. But he was
largely a man of hope who was fortified jointly by reason and faith.
Perhaps he took to heart Saint Augustine and realized that he was a
citizen of-a participant in-two cities: the City of God and the City of
Man.
In essence, the dual citizenship concept suggests that Murray was
both a contributing member to the public square and an ardent
American citizen. But he was also a faithful Catholic and obedient son
of the Church. For some individuals, it is hard to imagine that such a
person could exist, yet this is how he served the common good and the
public interest during his relatively brief life. But because of his
formation as an American and a Catholic, Murray demonstrated that
American Catholics can simultaneously be faithful members of the
Church and contributing members of the American republican
democracy. Indeed, their greatest contribution to our democracy may
be in recalling America to the understanding of the human person and
human institutions that animated the founding of the country-an
understanding whose greatest expositors include Fr. Murray, John Paul
II, and Benedict XVI.
In order to better understand Murray, a bit of background is in order.
He was born in New York City in 1904, the son of an Irish-American
mother and a Scottish-American lawyer-father. He entered the Society
of Jesus at the age of sixteen. After his theological studies and
ordination in the United States, he pursued doctoral studies at the
Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome.
His doctoral studies
concentrated on the doctrines of the Trinity and grace. Upon successful
completion of these studies in 1937, he returned to the United States to
teach at the Jesuit theologate in Woodstock, Maryland. In 1941, he was
appointed as the editor of the journal Theological Studies.
Notwithstanding his own theological expertise, he was drawn into
various projects with different Catholic groups and organizations,
including the predecessor of the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Conference.
Some of these projects intersected with the relationship between the
Church and the state. Others drew on his understanding of how the
moral perspective might or ought to intersect with public policy. His
writing on church-state matters (largely influenced by his living in a
"non-Catholic country") brought him into conflict with several
American authors and the prefect of the Holy Office, Alfredo Cardinal
Ottaviani. In 1954, he was instructed by his Jesuit superiors that he was
not to write and publish in this field anymore. However, in 1963,
fortune again changed for him in this regard, and he was invited to
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attend the Second Vatican Council, then in progress, as a peritus [an
advisor] (largely at the insistence of Cardinal Spellman of New York),
where he contributed enormously to the Declaration on Religious
Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae Personae. His best-known publication
was the book We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the

American Proposition,which contained thirteen essays written between
1950 and 1960, the year the book was published. At the age of sixtythree in 1967, Murray died of cardiac arrest. Despite his early death, his
impact on many issues, including religious liberty, lives on to the
present day.
Although Murray was a theologian, he astutely studied the
relationship between the Church and the state-or, as his predecessors
in the Society of Jesus, Francis Suhrez and Robert Bellarmine called
them-the two swords. Following their lead, Murray largely agreed
that there are two distinct sovereigns or authorities. The first is the
temporal, as represented by the civil authorities and the state. The
second is the spiritual-and for Suhrez, Bellarmine, and Murray, this
was the Catholic Church with the pope as the Vicar of Christ. While
each of these authorities enjoyed distinctive realms of influence, they
were not-and cannot be-hermetically insulated from one another. It
was an essential part of Murray's work, both before his silencing in
1954 and after he was brought to the Second Session of Vatican II in
1963, to demonstrate that there is an area-which I shall identify as the
public square-where the two sovereigns often do, indeed must,
encounter one another. The reason for this is that both the Church and
the state can and ought to claim in legitimate and proper fashion their
respective roles in this public place where they exercise in due and
authentic fashion their respective authorities. With regard to the
Church, Murray intensely defended her right, indeed her obligation, to
enter the public square to present her message and wisdom to the world
through proposition, not imposition. And it is equally inevitable that the
state, as it naturally tends to expand its authority to address the many
concerns of the human family, will touch-sometimes inadvertently,
but sometimes quite consciously-upon the place where the person is
compelled by a well-formed conscience to render unto God what is
God's and not unto Caesar.
As a principal contributor to the Second Vatican Council's
Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae Personae,

Murray agreed with Pope Paul VI who, in his final exhortation at the
conclusion of the Council in December 1965, rhetorically asked of the
civil authorities of the world the question: what does the Church ask of
you today? The Pope offered his answer: "She asks of you only liberty,
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the liberty to believe and to preach her faith, the freedom to love her
God and serve Him, the freedom to live and to bring to men her
message of life. Do not fear her." 2 Undoubtedly, Paul VI saw the
faithful not only as members of the Church but also as members of and
participants in civil society who must have their freedom to do what
properly belongs to the Church. For after all, they are her members in
the world who have the capacity to deal with and participate in the
temporal affairs of the world. They are citizens of the temporal realm,
but they are also disciples of Christ who enjoy citizenship in His realm
as well. The freedom of the Church, therefore, is their freedom as well.
It is vital to understand how Fr. Murray approached freedom. I doubt
that he would adopt as his perspective the "mystery of life" passage
from the U.S. Supreme Court plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:

It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.
... At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of

existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 3
My reason for making this point is that in his commentary to the
Declaration on Religious Freedom, Murray insisted that harmony must
exist between a person's duty of freely given obedience to what is true
and his or her right to the freedom that one exercises within civil
society. For him, this duty does not diminish the right nor does the right
diminish the obligation. Nonetheless, this right to freedom as a
religious person and as a member of the Church is a civil right that is to
be respected by the temporal authority. It is not a right that the temporal
power establishes or makes or confers; it is a right that exists due to the
nature of the human person-or, as Jacques Maritain acknowledged,
what is due to man because he is man. And, surely, the state did not
create man-God did.
As a citizen of two cities-as an American and as a Catholic-Fr.
Murray saw the rights of the religious believer, being defined by the
Declaration on Religious Freedom, and those of the American citizen,
being defined by the U.S. Constitution. Given this context, he was of
the opinion that the American legal order did not and could not restrain
the believer from holding and exercising this dual citizenship in an
2.

THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II730 (Walter Abbott, S.J. ed., Guild Press 1966).

3. 505 U.S. 833, 847, 851 (1992).
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active and public fashion. However, he further contended that the dual
citizen does not have a tenable claim to believe what is false or to
engage in what is wrong-as determined objectively, honestly, and
truthfully. To do otherwise would be, as he said, to engage in "moral
nonsense." In confirmation of this point, he contended that: "Neither
error nor evil can be the object of a right, only what is true and good."
Yet, Murray also staked the position that a person who entertains false
religious views must not be coerced into believing that which he or she
elects not to believe. Nor did Murray contend that the line between
clear error and a mistaken opinion is an easy one to define.
Murray was a careful thinker and an astute writer and speaker.
Hence, he took those extra steps to ensure that he would be understood
as he intended. In this Jesuit there was little guile. It is clear that the
religious freedom that he had in mind, being an important contributor to
the Declaration on Religious Liberty, is manifold: the right
encompasses the freedom of the Church for herself and the freedom of
the individual believer whose very dignity mandates religious freedom.
In his discussion of the Declaration's text, Murray explicitly stated that
the Declaration was not about personal conscience; rather, it was about
religious freedom. He elaborated this point by indicating that the right
to the free exercise of religious freedom is not founded on freedom of
conscience. In essence, the Declaration was not intended to advance the
claim that a person has the right to follow one's conscience in the
matters that the Declaration addresses simply because one's conscience
is the justification for doing one thing and not another. Neither does the
language of the Declaration's text itself further this notion. Murray
bluntly pointed out that this approach was based on a "perilous
theory"-the peril being the reliance on subjectivism where individual
conscience rather than objective truth determines what is right and what
is wrong, what is true and what is false.
The freedoms addressed by the Declaration, which contains major
elements penned by John Courtney Murray, provide some insight into
the notion of dual citizenship of which I have been speaking. The
individual, according to Murray-and, I hasten to add, yours truly-is
entitled to expect certain protections from the servant state. In the
context of the religious believer, especially the Catholic addressed in the
Declaration, the believer is a participant in the common good. As the
Second Vatican Council defined this in the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modem World, the common good is "the sum of those
conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual
members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment,
today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently
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involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race." 4 This
translates into a two-fold duty of the state. The first obligation entails
the protection of religious freedom as a civil right. The second follows
the first: this is the duty to cultivate an environment in which religious
persons can fulfill their religious obligations without hindrance. One
need only think of the methods employed by National Socialism in
Germany, as described by the Oxford don Nathaniel Micklem in his
book National Socialism and the Catholic Church, where the state

delighted in erecting constant challenges to the Church by violating
these two important principles. 5 Governments do have a proper
authority in directing the temporal sphere, but this does not include
jurisdiction over public worship and religious practices, including the
rights of religious individuals to participate in government through their
citizenship. States have the fundamental responsibility of ensuring that
freedoms are exercised in an ordered fashion so that the common good
is both protected and promoted. However, the state must not intrude
upon the exercise of the rights of its citizens, many of whom are
dwellers and participants in the City of God and the City of Man.
Murray understood that each citizen and each Catholic who claims
dual citizenship must avoid a problematic condition of modern times.
He noted in the early 1960s that the "barbarian" lived in our midst. The
barbarian of whom he spoke was not clad in bearskins and carrying a
club but could be wearing elegant business attire or an academic robe
and using a fine writing instrument. But if this person failed to exercise
civility, he or she risked becoming the barbarian of the modern age.
This does not mean that the citizen or the dual citizen had to be a
milquetoast; rather, it means that one must avoid the lures of nihilism
and the tendency to undermine rational and objective standards of
judgment. For Fr. Murray, the citizen of both cities must desire to live
together with others and to talk with others in order to both understand
others and be understood by others. He knew that "[c]ivility dies with
the death of the dialogue." 6 He acknowledged the appropriateness of
John XXIII's "four pillars" for society-truth, love, justice, and
4.

SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE

CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD
26 (1965) [hereinafter GAUDIUM ET SPES], available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/ii vatican_council/documents/vat-ii cons_19651207
.gaudium-et-spes en.html.
5. See generally NATHANIEL MICKLEM, NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH (1939) (discussing the barriers to religious freedom erected by the National Socialist
government of Germany between 1933 and 1938).
6. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S., The Civilization of the Pluralist Society, in WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 31 (Sheed & Ward
1960).

2010]

Remarks of Robert John Araujo, S.J.

vii

freedom-as being essential virtues of the good citizen who lives
civility.
In addressing what the dual citizen needs to take stock of, Murray
anticipated the question asked by the Second Vatican Council in the
Pastoral Constitution: "Quid est homo-what is man?" 7 As he
recognized, this is the question of the present age of rapidly advancing
technological development, instantaneous communication, and
increasing tensions, exemplified by the era of the Cold War that had not
even reached its apogee during Murray's lifetime. The answer to the
question "quid est homo?" requires understanding human ontology by
investigating a series of related issues. Two of the most fundamental
are these: what is the origin of the human person, and what is the
destiny of the human person? From these two realms of investigation
comes a third closely related matter: what can the human person know
or come to know? For the Catholic, these questions ultimately bring the
individual person into acknowledgment of relationship-that is,
relationship with God and relationship with one another, meaning
whomever God sends our way. At the crux of these relationships is
human salvation and achieving our proper destiny-meeting and being
with God one day.
Murray knew that many persons were skeptical of this understanding
of human nature. Some even ridiculed the idea. But he was a man of
grace and graciousness who would not let skepticism or ridicule deter
him from proclaiming that dual citizenship is the calling of the religious
believer-and certainly the person who put on Christ through his or her
baptism. Murray surely spoke to Catholics, but, like the Church, he
addressed people of all faiths or no faith, who were honest enough to
acknowledge that these questions about human origin and destiny
were-and remain-central to the formulation of sound public policy.
That is why he understood so well the pluralist world in which
Christians live and why they must be good citizens of two cities.
And how does the dual citizen prepare oneself for the tasks at hand?
Murray returned to the four notions developed by John XXIH in Pacem
in Terris: truth, love, justice, and freedom. It is critical to note that
these four principles were not narrowly parochial, but rather, universal
to the human condition. Let me offer what I consider an accurate
assessment and explication of each.
Truth emerges from faith, and it must also come to light from reason.
Given this framework, truth for the Catholic emerges from a number of

7. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 4, ][ 10, 12.
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important matters of faith that relate to reason. The most fundamental
principle here is Jesus Christ who is "the way, the truth, and the life."
Building upon the nature of the Church as the Body of Christ, we recall
that the Church is the witness to the truth-especially God's truth-in
the world. The Church is also a teacher who proposes to her sons and
daughters and all people of good will the truth about human nature and
the destiny of each member of the human family. To reiterate a point
made earlier, the Church addresses this matter with the question from
the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modem World, asking,
"Quid est homo?" The Church and her individual members are also
pilgrims who are on the road searching for the truth of issues that the
human family encounters more deeply on a recurring basis or for the
first time. Of course, a longstanding quest concerning truth is the path
of each person toward individual salvation promised by God, who loved
the world so much that He gave us His only Son so that we might live
with Him forever. But the truth about man is that he is not alone; he
lives in society, a society that must sustain the individual person by
being well-ordered, protective of human dignity, and rooted in the truth
of God's plan for the human family. These are necessary conditions for
truth to be pursued and known.
Something that must have crossed Murray's mind on more than a few
occasions is the foundation of truth on which society and the state are
constructed. So, in order to be acting in harmony with their respective
missions, society and the state must avoid any unjust discrimination that
undermines the dignity of the human person. This principle surfaces on
many fronts of human existence. Thus, the fashion in which society and
the state treat each member of the human family must be guided by the
truth that is God's plan for His most beloved creation. As John XXIII
reminded us about the truth of human nature, all persons are equally
noble in their natural dignity regardless of their status in society, which
demonstrates some aspects of human differences.
As one contemplates the essence of truth from a Christian
perspective, the following understanding emerges: God inclines the
human person, his society, and his government in dealing with other
persons, societies, and states in a fashion that should promote
understanding and cooperation rather than suspicion and conflict. This
truth does not require or expect the sacrifice of individual identities of
persons and their cultures, but it does mandate the conscious
abandonment and rejection of those beliefs and practices which are
injurious to other persons and their societies.
The truth that is God also cultivates a strong appreciation and desire
for the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. For those unfamiliar
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with these core principles of Catholic social doctrine, the concept of
subsidiarity begins to take shape in the encyclical letter of Pope Pius XI
entitled Quadragesimo Anno. In this letter, Pius XI defined the
principle of subsidiarity as that which provides the proper relationship
among the individual, the family, the local society, the nation, and the
world.8 In essence, the principle of subsidiarity reminds us that most
decisions and the actions that emerge are best made or conducted at the
lowest level, i.e., the level closest to where the result of the decision or
action is to be implemented.
The principle of solidarity is founded on the intrinsic social nature of
the human person and this person's equality in dignity and rights with
all other persons. This principle mandates at some level a unity that
brings together all persons and their societies in such a way that
interdependence becomes both essential and real. Unlike the strains of
exaggerated individualism that are sometimes claimed to be the basis of
the American experiment, Murray recognized and affirmed two
principles of our social nature, i.e., subsidiarity and solidarity, as
fundamental elements of the Church's social doctrine and essential to
the democratic processes that enable citizens to participate in the
formulation of their law and the legal system in which the law
functions. And democratic processes surely were of an interest to John
Courtney Murray, not simply as an instrumental means of governance
but as an expression of the social nature of the human person.
For the purposes of this presentation, one further word must be
offered about truth. Toward the end of Murray's life, as well as during
the present age, truth encountered an especially durable antithesis, that
is, relativism. Skeptical minds and a skeptical world never tire of
fomenting the doctrine that there is no truth. As Pilate suspiciously
retorted to Christ during the trial that preceded his crucifixion: "What is
truth?" This commonly held attitude labors to replace truth with
relativism on many fronts. Regardless of where relativism surfaces, its
common denominator typically denies the universal nature and essence
of the human person; it advocates that all views on any issue have equal
merit; and it often urges the acceptance of the view that human freedom
means allowing the person to believe in and do whatever he or she
wishes because one's personal justification for doing or not doing
Murray steadfastly maintained the
something is what matters.

8.

See PIus XI, ENCYCLICAL LETrER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO: ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
79 (1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy father/pius-xilencyclicals/

SOCIAL ORDER [

documents/hfip-xienc_19310515_quadragesimo-annoen.html
order concerning the activities of people and organizations).

(discussing the need for social
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proposition-again, one with which people of all faiths, or no faith, can
agree-that to speak of my truth rather than the truth is antithetical to
meaningful dialogue that leads to the discovery of what is true and what
is not.
And so, we must now turn to this important subject involving human
freedom. What is it? What is authentically constitutive of it? These are
questions that Fr. Murray had the appetite to pursue. The place of
beginning is the genesis of humanity. God conferred upon Adam and
Eve freedom. He gave them one proscription, but He also endowed
them with free will, consciousness of right and wrong, and intelligent
reason. A part of this gift was the freedom to investigate and pursue the
truth over falsehood. This freedom gives the human person the liberty
to speak, to engage others in respectful encounter, to associate with likeand unlike-minded, and to pursue those vocations in life that are
attractive to the individual while mindful of the common good.
Eventually for the Christian, freedom must be for God and His
commands; it cannot be a freedom from God, for that leads a person,
perhaps unknowingly, into a dependence on the lures that tempt the
human person to follow some course in life that is incompatible with
what God asks. In short, the freedom of the human person is
meaningless except in light of a freedom for the truth. To speak of
freedom without relating it to the truth is to speak of a form of slavery,
not authentic freedom. Of course, one of the greatest freedoms of all is
that of worshipping God-it is a freedom that the American
Constitution, so important to Murray, protects in both printed word and
intent. This freedom belongs to the individual believer and it belongs to
the universal Church. As Pope Paul VI noted at the conclusion of the
Second Vatican Council, it is the one thing that the Church asks of the
temporal authorities. It is the very thing that so many of her martyrs
have sought: the freedom to follow and praise God.
Murray agreed that the individual person who seeks the truth and
exercises authentic freedom must still have societies-the family, the
community, the nation-in order to flourish. But each society must
have respect for the dignity of its individual members. It is society's
responsibility to promote the common good, which ensures that each
person's freedom is always accompanied by its natural and authentic
companion, i.e., taking responsibility for one's actions. This is why the
individual, when making choices for himself or herself, cannot neglect
the reality that many of these choices have or can have an impact on
others whose human dignity must enter the consideration of how
freedom is to be exercised and enjoyed. The authentic restraint on one's
freedom, then, is not the force of the power of authority but of the
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individual's own prudence, reason, and charity for the other. Authentic
freedom is essential to aiding each person to come to know the truth
about the rights he or she possesses and the corresponding responsibility
and obligations that serve as guarantors of the rights of each and every
person. In this regard, it is the City of Man that should help each person
acknowledge this dual role of personal freedom. With this assistance at
hand, the common good is both achievable and sustainable.
This objective for freedom and its sustainability logically brings us to
a third principle of concern to Fr. Murray: charity, or love. Basic to the
human condition is a longing, a natural inclination for genuine
solidarity. Authentic freedom, as just explained, inevitably leads the
person who exercises it to the realization that there is Another, that there
are others, and that it is in relationship with others that we exercise our
true freedom. Charity begins with consciousness of the other and then
leads to attentiveness for the other. It becomes the foundation of
relationships that deepen with the passage of time. Just as true freedom
is contrasted with the shadow of freedom, charity is contrasted with
exploitation of the other, rather than recognition of the other as having
correlative value and dignity. Charity does not preclude necessary
fraternal correction, but at the same time it necessitates concern and
respect for the other that include the readiness to extend the helping
hand. Charity is not alien to citizenship; it is its cornerstone. Charity
acknowledges the existence of the other by seeing in the other the
brother or sister rather than the adversary or outsider. There is no doubt
that John Courtney Murray acknowledged and accepted the reality of
citizenship in both the City of God and the City of Man-that there is
no greater love than to give of oneself for those in greater need.
Charity-love-is the cohort of solidarity. It is the animator of
citizenship regardless of the city in which the citizenship is practiced.
And it is charity that elevates one's consciousness toward the final
principle so vital to citizenship: justice.
Justice is, at its core, the right relation between the person and the
other; moreover, it is the guarantor of the suum cuique, to each his due.
It is also the vital mechanism that regulates every society so that it is
well-ordered yet tempered by charity, freedom, and the truth.
Inevitably, justice is that which determines the path to the common
good and provides for its sustenance. It ensures the proper relationship
between the exercise of responsibility and the preservation of rights
given by the Creator. It is also the fundamental command for those who
exercise authority in the temporal sphere-as Scripture reminds us,
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"love justice, you that are the judges of the earth." 9 The civil authority
that is just and practices justice is most competent in its craft; the civil
authority that varies from this path makes itself a candidate to forfeit its
authority, as Francis Suhrez and Robert Bellarmine reminded us many
years ago.
For justice to be effective and eternal, it must be tempered with
equity and mercy for all. Those charged with its administration must
never forget the fundamental precepts of the common good and the
suum cuique. For justice to be true to its vocation, it must be incorrupt,
objective, and devoid of partisanship. Those who contend that justice
can exist apart from moral considerations do not know justice in its true
form. Justice has the further vocation of installing and preserving right
relations between parties who are in dispute with one another. Justice is
the solution to their dispute, and it must make the distinction between
right and wrong and install the former and ban the latter. Those who
know justice also know reciprocity. Murray understood well the
counsel of St. Augustine of Hippo: "In the absence of justice, what is
sovereignty but organized brigandage?"' 0 The just authority is the one
that not only permits but encourages the practice of subsidiarity and
promotes solidarity. Justice is ever vigilant and eternal and calls as its
friends and collaborators truth, freedom, and charity.
These four principles had a significant bearing on the thought of
Murray and his answer to the question "quid est homo?" He proceeded
to address this question, I believe, in the context of the relation between
the Church and the state, and he did so with zeal, wit, patience
(especially during his period of being silenced from 1954 to the early
1960s), and determination. As he once told a then young Jesuit, Charles
Whelan (who would become a longtime professor of law at Fordham
University and an associate editor of America magazine), "Do not
repeat what I have said. Improve on it. Extend it. Correct it. Attack
problems that remain unsolved."' 1 Although trained in theology rather
than constitutional law, he astutely comprehended the 1787 text of the
Constitution given to the American republic by its founders and that of
the First Amendment adopted a few years later in 1791. In this regard,
he became troubled by the U.S. Supreme Court's growing emphasis on
"separation" and diminishment regarding the free exercise of religion.
9. Wisdom 1:1 (Douay-Rheims).
10. St. Augustine, The City of God: Book IV, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH: SAINT
AUGUSTINE THE CITY OF GOD, BOOKS 1-VII 189, 195 (Demetrius B. Zema, S.J. & Gerald G.
Walsh, S.J., trans., Cath. Univ. of Am. Press, Inc. 2008) (1950).
I1. Charles M. Whelan, S.J., The Enduring Problems of Religious Liberty, 153 AM. MAG.

368, 369 (Nov. 30, 1985).
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He knew well that the First Amendment to the Constitution spoke
against establishment of religion by the national government, not the
separation of religion from the life of the American people. Why did he
make this distinction? Was he simply quibbling over the meaning and
use of particular words? An affirmative or negative answer to this
question without further ado would miss an important point about
Murray and his work. After all, he was occupied with truth, freedom,
caritas(charity), and justice!
He knew that the individual person who is also a believer is a
member of civil society where the non-establishment of religion is vital
to the freedom of one and all in the United States. But he also knew
that the religious believer is simultaneously a citizen of the City of God,
for whom the free exercise of religion, not just in private but in public
as well, is equally imperative. This is a truth, pure and simple, about
the American Constitution. But he saw some members of the
judiciary-perhaps inspired by a particular anti-religious sentiment
incongruous with the meaning of the Constitution-forgetting that the
First Amendment had two elements dealing with religion that had to be
understood together, applied together, and, most important of all for all
citizens, lived together. To illustrate his position, as Fr. Whelan has
suggested, Murray saw no constitutional problem with the City of Man
subscribing to "in God we trust," but he would have shied away from
"in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit we trust." As Fr. Whelan concludes,
reason would necessitate why one was appropriate in the City of Man
and the other was not.
The justification underlying his reason most assuredly was based on
the fact that the human person, and the dignity that accompanies
existence in two cities, cannot separate himself into components that
can only be lived in one city and not the other. But when separation is
emphasized at the expense of religious exercise in the public sphere,
society and its state become either Jacobin, for the traditional student of
history, or totalitarian, for the contemporary one. It is true that the
American society is religiously pluralist, but it is equally true that it is
also religious. Hence, the concurrent need for both non-establishment
and protection of the free exercise of religion becomes all the more
apparent. The human person is a whole and organic being. It would be
unreasonable and illogical, then, to ask the person to separate his or her
religious nature from his or her civil nature.
Here, I must borrow from, but also extend Murray: while truth may
be disagreeable, it is still true. And this is the truth about the nature of
the human person who finds himself or herself concurrently a citizen of
two cities. But for anyone who might scoff at the suggestions I have
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made about the duality of citizenship, he or she might wish to consider
the possibility that an aspect of this thesis is contained in the motto
often used to describe the American experiment: "E Pluribus Unum"from many, one. In the context of this discussion: "E Duobus Unum"from two, one. Perhaps my suggestion gains a bit of credibility if we
recall that one of Fr. Murray's essays was entitled E Pluribus Unum:
The American Consensus (originally published in 1954).12 Knowing
that truth was a matter of great interest to Murray, we may bear in mind
that the Declaration of Independence recalls a number of vital and selfevident truths about fundamental human nature. And surely one such
truth about the nature of the person not only in the United States but in
many other nations is that many individuals consider themselves holders
of citizenship in the City of God and the City of Man. Clearly Fr.
Murray was familiar with the Supreme Court dicta of Justice Douglas in
Zorach v. Clauson, decided in 1952, wherein Douglas stated: "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."1 3
For those not familiar with Zorach, it decided that the New York State
program designed to overcome the problem in McCollum v. Board of
Education1 4 by allowing release of students during school time to
receive religious instruction was constitutional.15 However, for a few
members of the Supreme Court, this recognition likely constituted a
breach of the infamous "wall of separation" first used by Justice Hugo
Black in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.16

While Justice

Black's understanding of the language of the Constitution regarding no
establishment and free exercise was, in my estimation, muddled, John
Courtney Murray's understanding was clear because he, too,
acknowledged the reality that there are religious people who are at the
same time patriotic citizens.
There is no doubt that John Courtney Murray would not want to see
the atheist or the agnostic deprived of his or her participation in the res
publicae because their arguments are based on purely secular grounds.
But we must not forget that it would be equally obnoxious to him to
demand that the religious person make arguments about public policy

12.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., E Pluribus Unum: The American Consensus, in WE

HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION, supra note 6,

at 43.

13. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
14. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) (holding that allowing
religious teachers to come into public schools to offer religious instruction violated the
Constitution).
15. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314-15 (discussing the separation-of-church-and-state standard).
16. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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from purely secular grounds. To do so would deprive the religious
person from participation in the temporal sphere by making argument
from the Divine Wisdom that can be known by right reason-or to use a
term familiar with the Constitution's framers: the natural law. When he
tackled this theme in 1954, Murray knew that the natural law had
become a stranger to most American universities of the time. What was
familiar to the framers as the basis of the American consensus was now
pass6. And yet, for Murray, it remained the vibrant bulwark of the
moral universe that has a binding effect on all persons because objective
reason, not force, makes it so. It is, first and last, the "basis of the free
and ordered political life."17 In his words, "Catholic participation in the
American consensus has been full and free, unreserved and
unembarrassed, because the contents of this consensus-the ethical and
political principles drawn from the tradition of the natural law-approve
themselves to the Catholic intelligence and conscience." 18 But now in
the early twenty-first century, Murray's assessment appears to be
accurate: the intellectual, i.e., the reasoned, underpinning of law has
been succeeded by "the voluntarist idea of law as will." 19 When right
reason and the moral instinct are supplanted by a utilitarian calculus that
is not so much the product of reason as it is of the will, then the
consensus so important to both Murray-a citizen of two cities-and
the framers of the American republic would likely disappear.
This is why the hope of civil unity and religious integrity were
simultaneously so important to John Courtney Murray. While they are
of two distinct orders, they find home in individual persons who are
good citizens of the temporal order as they are faithful believers in God.
Freedom is essential to the person who lives in a democracy. That is
why the freedom to be citizens of both cities must be cherished by the
citizen and protected by the state. Otherwise, the latter will fall into a
tyranny the kind about which Micklem spoke seventy years ago.
Recent human history demonstrates that when the secular temporal
authority neglects the universal truth about human nature and replaces it
with a strong positivist or statist regime, the will rather than the intellect
governs society, but the order that often results is not that of ordered
liberty but something else. The dual citizen is equipped to recognize
this danger and urge, through objectively reasoned argument, that
individual and societal freedom require us to choose another path. The
wisdom that the dual citizen is so capable of bringing to public
17. MURRAY, supra note 6, at 41.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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discourse and decision-making is attuned to the common good (which
Murray termed "normative for all law"), 20 to the suum cuique, and to
the charity of which the statist view is all too often neglectful.
For John Courtney Murray, truth, freedom, justice, and charity merge
into the essence and existence of the dual citizen-or as he called it,
"the dualism of mankind's two hierarchically ordered forms."2 1 But
when this dualism is denied or repressed, human dignity is harmed.
While this dignity is sometimes a difficult mechanism to maintain, it is
nonetheless a vital component of societies where truth, freedom, justice,
and benevolence are valued because they, and the human dignity to
which they are entitled, become the defense of civilized society. While
the dualism is represented as two distinct yet compatible sovereignties
in society, its components take residence in individual persons to whom
the temporal authorities owe not only respect but also fortification.
While the Church and the state are and must remain two, the person is
and must remain one. The Church and the state may be separate from
one another, but the human person who is a believer cannot be
subdivided or compartmentalized, i.e., his religious nature must be
private or secret and his civil nature must be the only dimension that is
public. To demand a wall of separation of and within the human person
is to ask the unreasonable, to expect the impossible, and to divide the
indivisible.
A state that is a limited government understands this; however, one
that fallaciously claims omni-competence probably will not. The dual
citizen is not free to impose his or her will on the fellow citizen who
participates in only one sovereignty; nevertheless, the dual citizen must
remain at liberty to propose to fellow dwellers of the City of Man
solutions to common problems that intensify ordered liberty and
promote the common good while ensuring that each member of society
receives his or her due. As to the individual person, to each his due, so
too must we apply this wise counsel to the Church and the state: to each
its due. John Courtney Murray was a man who strove incessantly to
take the high ground in the proud display of his dual citizenship. He
would not impose on others what he himself believed. Yet, by the same
token, he would not cower from those who denied not only the
propositions which gave him a distinctly Catholic view of the world but
also those universal principles that constitute the basis of the American
Proposition. He was a man who sought peace in a pluralistic society
and world, and that is why he was a model dual citizen. He understood
20. Id. at 58.

21. Id. at 64.
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well the competence of the state and why it could not succor a particular
religion while at the same time acknowledging the need to protect the
free exercise of religion in the public sphere. Perhaps he took his lead
from another predecessor who also claimed dual citizenship and died
the king's good servant, and God's first: St. Thomas More.

